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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A HISTORY OF JUDICIAL TENURE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
*J. PAUL SELSAM
An independent judiciary is one of the most important features of our
government. Without it, no matter how liberal the constitution may be, the
people have no assurance that their rights will be protected or their liberties
safeguarded against the usurpation of power by other branches of the govern-
ment.
Judicial independence involves two fundamental factors: tenure of office
and salary. That judges should have a "fixed" salary-that is, one beyond
the reach of recurring legislatures to change at will and thus jeopardize the
position of the judge-has generally been conceded in our political theory
and practice. Over tenure of office, however, much controversy has arisen.
Judicial tenure throughout the history of Pennsylvania has varied greatly and
has given rise to many sharp political encounters.
As a result of a revolution in 1688 judicial tenure during good behavior
was established in England. At first, however, this was dependent upon the
will of King William, whose commissions ran quamdiu se bene gesserint.' A
little later, by the Act of Settlement of 1701, Parliament decreed that judges'
commissions should be during good behavior, with the possibility of removal
upon the address of both houses.
2
By the terms of the Charter granted William Penn by King Charles I1,
the power to erect courts and appoint judicial officers was conferred upon the
Proprietary., But Penn was willing to forego to some degree the exercise of
*A. B., Franklin and Marshall College, 1921; M. A., Princeton University, 1924; Ph. D.,
Princeton University, 1930. Attended the Hague Academy of International Law, 1931. Was
awarded the "Diplome" by the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva,
Switzerland, 1932. Manager of the Publications Sales Office of the League of Nations, 1932.
Instructor in the Department of History and Government, Franklin and Marshall College, 1925-
28. Now engaged in writing "The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolu-
tionary Democracy" (To be published this spring).
'Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England (from the Fifth London Edition,
New York, 1851), p. 597. In 1692 William refused his assent to a bill which had passed both
Houses of Parliament for establishing the independence of judges by law and fixing their sal-
aries.
2ibid, p. 591. This is said to have been the ancient course until the advent of James I in
1601.
aFor the Charter and the various Frames of Government see Colonial Records of Pennsyl-
vania, vol. I.
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this right,, and by Article 17 of the Frame of Government of the Province of
Pennsylvania (1682) the judges were to be nominated by the Provincial
Council and commissioned by the Governor or his Deputy, to serve for one
year, In the very next section, however, Penn stated that since "the present
conditions of the province" would not admit "of so quick a revolution of
officers," he would nominate and appoint judges and other officers "for so
long time as every such person shall well behave himself in the office . . . -5
This provision was formally incorporated in the Frame of Government of
1683, for the Council was to "elect and present to the Governor or his Deputy,
a double number of persons to serve for Judges, . . . to continue so long
as they shall well behave themselves .... "1
In the early days there was no supreme court as such, the same court
often sitting in different capacities. From this practice some curious situations
resulted. For instance, in the case of Hasting v. Yarnall, in 1686, the court
sitting as a court of equity reversed its own judgment previously entered
while sitting as a court of law."
The first man really to discharge the highest judicial office in Pennsyl-
vania was Nicholas Moore, appointed Chief Justice-then called "prior
judge"--in August, 1684. 8 His career as such was short, for the next year
the Assembly charged him with committing "high crimes and misdemean-
ours."O It does not appear that he ever came to trial before the Council,
probably because of alleged ill-health, 'O but other judges were appointed and
Moore was at length deprived of his office and dignities."
In Markham's Frame of Government of 1696 nothing is said about the
term of office of judges. The same is true of the Charter of Privileges of
1701. the last charter or frame of government granted by William Penn.
which.served the province until 1776.12 During this period it is obvious that
judicial tenure depended upon the pleasure of the governor. After a supreme
4Lawrence Lewis, Jr.. "'The Courts of Pennsylvania in the Seventeenth Century," Penn-
sylvania Magazine of History and Biography, V, p. 143.
5I Col. Rec.. pp. 35-6.
eArt. xvi. Although this provision seems to establish explicitly tenure during good be-
havior, yet we are told that judges were commissioned by William Penn in 1684 for two years
only. See Robert Proud, The History of Pennsylvania (2 vol., Philadelphia, 1797), vol. I, pp.
286-7.
7Records Chester Co. Ct., 3d. lwk. 10mo. 1686. 5d. lwk. 10ro. 1686. For material on the
judicial system of Pennsylvania in the 17th century. see Lewis, op. cit.; William H. Loyd,
The Early Courts of Pennsylvania (Boston, 1910); H. Frank Eshleman, "The Constructive
Genius of David Lloyd," Pa. Bar Assn. Reports, 1910.
6"Minutes of the Provincial Council," I Col. Ree., p. 121.
9ibid, p. 135.
'0ibid, p. 153.
llibid, p. 190.
1
2
5y this Charter the governor resumed the power of direct appointment. See William
R. Shepherd, "A History of Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania," Columbia University
Studies in Histozt, Economics and Public Law, vol. VI, p. 373.
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court was finally established its judges were recommissioned from time to
time by the governor and it appears that they generally held their offices until
death or resignation.'
The attempts of the province to establish a genuine supreme court were
generally frustrated by the Crown. It was alleged that the highest authority
resided in England. and that there was no need for such a court. The act of
1684 established what might be called a supreme court, but it was annulled
by William and Mary in 1693."1 In 1701 a new judicial act was adopted,
but again it was annulled by the Crown. 1" The Act of February 28, 1710-11,
creating a supreme court and designating one member as the chief justice,
was also repealed by the Queen in Council. 16 The same thing happened to
the Act for Erecting a Supreme or Provincial Court of Law and Equity, passed
on May 28, 1715.17
By this time the colonists were determined to establish a system of courts
as they saw fit, so they resorted to strategy. The Charter stated that all
laws had to be submitted to the Crown for approval, and if not declared void
within five years, became law by lapse of time. Thus laws were often put
into operation immediately upon their adoption, but were not sent to England
until the time limit had almost expired. If rejected, they were passed again
in a slightly amended form, and again held here for a long period.
In 1722 an Act for Establishing Courts of judicature was passed, stating
that "there shall be three persons of known integrity and ability, commission-
ated by the governor . . . to be judges of the "supreme court", one of
whom shall be distinguished in his commission by the name of chief-justice."' 8
This act was put into operation, but for some unknown reason was never con-
sidered by the Crown."' Five years later a new act was passed, almost
identical with the previous one. This was repealed by the King in Council
on August 12, 1731,20 so the Act of 1722 remained in force in accordance with
the Charter. This remained the basis of the judicial system of Pennsylvania
until after the Revolution."1
The judges of the supreme court, while virtually serving during good
behavior, nevertheless held their commissions at the pleasure of the Governor
or Proprietary. As time went on a bitter battle arose between the Assembly
and the Governor and Council which represented the Proprietary interests.
13Loyd, op. cit., p. 104. Shepherd, op. cit., p. 370: "The tentre of office was during the
good behavior of the incumbent."
14Eshleman, op. cit., p. 418.
V'Statutes at Large, II, pp. 148-159.
Iribid, pp. 301-331. Repealed Feb. 30, 1713-4.
.7Repealed by the Lords Justices in Council, July 21, 1719. Statutes at Large, III.
18section vi. Passed May 22, 1722. ibid.
19ibid, III, p. 308.
20ibid, IV, p. 95.
2-Pa. Bar Assn. Reports, 1910, pp. 435-6. It was amended in 1731, and again in 1759
and 1767. See Statutes at Large for amendments.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
One result of this was the attempt of the Assembly to establish by law tenure
during good behavior. On September 29, 1759, a law was passed stating
that the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, as well as the justices of the
Supreme Court, should hold their commissions quamdiu se bene gesserint, and
be removable only on the address of the Assembly. The reason given was
that the independence of the judiciary would thereby be more firmly estab-
lished.22 But such a move would have been a limitation upon the Charter
rights of the Proprietors, and also, as the Lords of the Committee of the
Council said, would "excite a just jealousy in the other colonies by seeming to
extend advantages to this proprietary government, which have been denied
to those under his majesty's immediate care. -2 1 The act was accordingly
disapproved on September 2. 1760. Such an act would have created a danger-
ous precedent for British colonial control and never could have been allowed
by the Crown.
When the first constitution of Pennsylvania was framed in 1776, there
was much agitation for a judiciary holding office during good behavior. It
was recognized by many that independence and efficiency would be endang-
ered by a limited term of office. But the opposition was too great! It will be
remembered that this constitution was the result of a political revolution-a
great democratic upheaval against the rule of the oligarchy of wealthy Phila-
delphia Quakers. Consequently, there was a determined opposition to "life
offices," as tenure during good behavior was called, so the best that could be
secured was a term of seven years, with the possibility of reappointment."
Section 20 of the new constitution provided that "The president, and in his
absence the vice-president, with the council, .. . shall have the power
to appoint and commissionate judges."
Despite the democratic circumstances under which this constitution was
framed, it is interesting to note that one of the principles of independence was
established, for the judges were not to be dependent upon recurring elections
for their tenure of office, but derived their power from the executive branch
of the government-the principle followed later by the framers of the Federal
Constitution.
Concerning the question of salaries the Colonists had long ago learned
that by controlling the stipend of the Royal Judge (or in Pennsylvania. the
appointee of the Proprietor) he could be compelled to do their bidding.
22Statutes at Large, V, p. 463.
23ibid, V, p. 724.
21Section 23. Limited tenure was found in only three other constitutions framed during
this period-those of Georgia, New Jersey and Vermont.
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With such a precedent before them the framers wisely provided that judges
should have "fixed salaries.
' ' 2
In spite of this clear provision trouble soon arose, for the Council of
Censors, that unique body provided to see that the Constitution be faithfully
executed, declared: "This most important injunction of the Convention has
not been complied with, as it ought. Permanent salaries, should without
delay be established by Act of Assembly for the justices of the supreme court,
for and during their respective continuance in office. Judges should have
nothing to hope or fear from any one. ' -
The Constitution of 1776 immediately aroused a storm of opposition and
the battle for revision began as soon as it was proclaimed. The Council of
Censors appointed a committee to consider what alterations were necessary.
It reported on January 17, 1784, proposing life tenure for the judges of the
Supreme Court.2'7  The report was adopted on every point, but the movement
for amendment failed. By a vote of 14 to 10 it was "Resolved, That there
does not appear to this council an absolute necessity to call a convention to
alter, explain, or amend the constitution."2S
The movement for revision continued, however, without interruption. On
March 4, 1789, the Republican assemblymen" were busy preparing petitions
to be circulated in the various counties, urging the Assembly to call a conven-
tion to meet in October. On March 24th the project was, by a vote of 41 to
17. formally submitted to the people.3° Four days later the Assembly ad-
journed for the summer recess, thus giving the members an opportunity to
ascertain the wishes of their constituents.'
When the Assembly met after the recess, being "satisfied" from the peti-
tions returned to it, and from personal inquiries made by members during the
summer, 2 that a convention was the will of the people, a formal call was voted
2Z;Section 23. "The judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have fixed salaries, be
commissioned for seven years only, though capable of re-appointment at the end of that term,
but removable for misbehavior at any time by the general assembly; .
26Report of the Council of Censors, printed by Francis Bailey, Philadelphia, 1784.
27jbid. It is interesting to note that this proposal was adopted by the Convention of 1790.
2-ibid.
29Those opposed to the Constitution were called anti-constitutionalists and later Republi-
cans, while its supporters were known as the Constitutionalists. The term Democrat was not
yet in wide use. Vide Graydon, Alexander, Memoirs of His Own Time (ed. by J. S. Littell,
Philadelphia, 1846), p. 331.
sOMinutes of the Third Session of the 12th General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, pp. 177-8.
31Part of the resolution read: "That this House, on the pleasure of the people in the prem-
ises being signified to them at their next sitting, will provide by law for the expenses and place
of meeting." ibid.
S2ibid, September 14. 1789.
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on September 15, 1789."'
An active campaign to try to influence the members of the convention
now began. Benjamin Franklin, then on the verge of the grave, opposed the
movement for a judiciary during good behavior, stating that it aimed "at
establishing a monarchy at least for life . ........ The Carlisle Gazette
of October 21, 1789, said: "Most men of any knowledge or reflection admit"
that judicial independence ought to be established. "This admitted, it neces-
sarily follows that their provision should be permanent, and that the tenure
on which they hold their appointments should be that of good behavior."
The convention met on November 24, 1789, at Philadelphia."5  No
record of its debates was printed, so we know little about the discussions
which took place. Much time, however, was spent in the Committee ol the
Whole discussing the provisions of the section relating to the judiciary. The
framers completed their work on February 26, 1790, and adjourned to enable
the people to inspect the result of their labors. The Convention re-convened
on August 9, and on September 2, 1790, formally proclaimed the constitution
by a vote of 61 to 1."
This Constitution, following the newly framed Federal Constitution, dis-
tinguished and defined the legislative, executive and judicial powers accord-
ing to the now classic American method. It declared that the judges of the
supreme court should hold their offices during good behavior, but "for any
reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the
governor may remove any of them, on the address of two-thirds of each
branch of the legislature.' '3 The judges were to receive "for their services
an adequate compensation, to be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.': s The long struggle for an independent
3-3ibid. The vote was 39 to 17. 7000 English and 3000 German copies of the resolution
for calling the Convention were ordered to be printed and distributed among the people. A
movement to postpone the consideration of this question was defeated by a vote of 37 to 19,
ibid, September 15.
34"Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of Pennsylvania,"
printed in Franklin's Works (Bigelow ed., New York and London, 1885), vol. X, p. 185.
3aMinutes of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, etc. (Philadelphia,
1789).
-'George Roberts, from the city of Philadelphia, cast the lone negative vote. ibid. On
August 14 and 16 discussion on the judiciary section took place, but no change was made re-
garding judicial tenure.
37Article 5, section 2.
38ibid.
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judiciary, serving during good behavior, was at last successful.!"
But the democratic spirit which had won such a triumphant victory in
1776 was not dead. The life tenure became the subject of vitriolic attacks,
culminating in a series of impeachment proceedings against the judges. It
was declared that such an institution as life tenure was aristocratic and had
no place in our government. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 in western
Pennsylvania was one manifestation of the opposition of these people, mainly
Scotch-Irish. to the stern rule of the Federalist party. The House-Tax or
Fries' Rebellion in 1799 was an indication of the same spirit among the
Germans in the eastern counties of Bucks, Montgomery and Northampton.
The Anti-Federalist party of Thomas Jefferson naturally found many
supporters in Pennsylvania. and in the presidential el-ction of 1796 the Fed-
eralists were able to carry the state only by a very narrow margin. Four
years later the Governor and House of Representatives were strongly Demo-
cratic-Republican (the old anti-constitutional party), while the Senate was
still Federalist. In 1804 the Jeffersonians secured complete control of the
legislative and executive branches of the government, but the life-judiciary
was filled with their opponents. The outcry against them was tremendous.
but it must be admitted that some of the opposition came from political leaders
who were looking at the offices with covetous eyes and plotting to divert the
salaries to partisan purposes.
40
After 1805 many petitions were received by the Legislature against life
tenure, and insistent demands were made for the revision or amendment of
the constitution. They usually ran like this: "It is believed that the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania might be improved by being so amended as to diminish
the patronage of the Governor, abolish all offices for life, secure a more equal
.gThe first indication of how the question would be decided came on December 10, 1789.
On a preliminary question embracing the judges of the Supreme Court only, it was decided by
a vote of 56 to 8 that the "Judges of the Supreme Court should hold their commissions during
good behavior. . . ".Minutes, pp. 34-5. The opponents of life tenure did not give up the
battle, for they immediately turned their attention to the question of removal. On Feb. 13,
1790, it was moved that the word may after governor be struck out, and in lieu thereof the
word shall inserted, thus making it mandatory for the governor to remove the judge on the
address of two-thirds of the legislature. But before a vote could be taken the session ad-
journed. Two days later the amendment was withdrawn, but another one was introduced to
pass an address to the governor simply by a majority vote, instead of two-thirds. This also
met with defeat. Quite a few of the same men were involved in both attempts.
40This is shown by the fact that many of the judges proceeded against were Federalists.
Loyd. op. cit., p. 149. The citation of English decisions in the opinions of the court greatly
exasperated the radical element, so an act was passed on March 19, 1810 (P.L., p. 136), which
provided that it should be unlawful "to read or quote in any court in this Commonwealth, any
British precedent or adjudication which may have been given or made subsequent to the fourth
day of July .... (1776)." This act was repealed on March 29, 1836. ibid., pp. 224-5.
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enjoyment of the right of suffrage, and have the magistrates and other officers
elected directly by the people.""
A Society of Friends of the People, organized in 1805, claimed that the
Constitution had produced in oicidls a sense of irresponsibility to the people.
and advocated the reform of the whole judicial system. The friends of Gov-
ernor McKean meanwhile organized a society called the Constitutional Re-
publicans, and petitioned against a convention. The whole issue was fought
out in the gubernatorial campaign of 1805, when McKean was re-elected and
the constitution vindicated by a narrow majority of about 5,000 votes in a
total of 82,500.42 In an address to the Legislature, Governor McKean said:
"The organization of the judicial powers of Pennsylvania has been long and
fairly condemned. But there is not a defect suggested, from any quarter
which the legislature is not competent to remedy."43
But this statement did not satisfy the opponents of life tenure, which the
legislature had no power to change. The agitation continued, and in 1825
the question of calling a convention was submitted to the people and decided
in the negative by a vote of 44,488 to 59,892. 44 By 1831, however, it was
generally conceded that many evils existed in the administration of justice."
The courts were simply overwhelmed with work, the judges themselves com-
plaining.16 One authority states that in proportion to the population, the
number of suits was greater in the last quarter of the 18th century and the
first half of the 19th than during any equal period subsequently.4
7
In the meantime great social and industrial changes had taken place and
the Assembly once more was petitioned to revise the constitution. Early in
1833 the Senate appointed a Committee to consider these petitions. On
February 20 the Committee reported favorably on submitting a call for a con-
vention to the people.4s The report proposed, however, to limit the action
of the convention to ten amendments named in the sundry petitions, the sec-
ond of which stated that judges should be appointed for a term of years,
rather than "the present tenure . . . which, in reality, amounts to hold-
ing the office for life: because it is evident from what has transpired within
the last ten years, that it is next to an impossibility to remove a judge by im-
peachment, or address to the Governor . . indeed, from past occur-
41Debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1837, vol. IV, pp. 396-7.
4-°Franklin S. Edmonds, "Development of Constitutional Limitations in Pennsylvania," Pa.
Bar Assn. Reports, 1915, (vol. 21), pp. 261-2.
"3Howard M. Jenkins, ed., Pennsylvania-Colonial and Federal (Philadelphia. 1903), II, p.
181.
44Edmonds, op. cit., p. 262.
45See Hazard, Register of Pennsylvania, IX, p. 36.
"Gibid, p. 361; vol. XIII, pp. 94-6.
47F. N. Thorpe, Constitutional History of the American People (2 vol., New York, 1898),
II, p. 45.
'8See Report of the Committee, read in the Senate on Feb. 20, 1833. Printed by Henry
Welsh, Harrisburg, 1833.
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rences, it would seem that. unless in a time of extreme political excitement,
judges may bid defiance to addresses and impeachments. . . . It is.
thought that the tenure of a judgeship, for a term of years not unreasonably
short or long, would on the one hand, preserve as far as necessary, the inde-
pendence of the judge, and on the other, prevent many of the evils now com-
plained of, and which, for many years. have caused much dissatisfaction
among the people in some parts of the state. .".
This report boded ill for the life tenure of the judiciary, but the Senate
rejected the bill embodying these proposals, so the matter of revision dragged
on for a few more years. "L9 In 1834 a meeting was held in Harrisburg for the
purpose of drafting a memorial praying the legislature to pass a law provid-
ing for the election of delegates to compose a "Convention for the purpose of
submitting an amended Constitution to the citizens of this Commonwealth for
their adoption or rejection." A committee, appointed to report what amend-
ments ought to be agreed upon by this convention, proposed the abolition of
all offices for life.!1
Thus it is evident that there was a persistent and constantly growing
sentiment for revision, though it is undoubtedly true that much of it was for
political reasons. The matter came to a head when the Commonwealth, on
account of the tremendous expenditure of borrowed money for public works,
temporarily' defaulted on the interest payments on the state debt. 52 In no
state was the effect of the panic of 1837 so overwhelming as in Pennsyl-
vania .5 3 The forces of discontent were thus consolidated and the call for a
convention to amend the constitution was finally adopted by a majority of
13,404t 4
The convention met in the Hall of the House of Representatives at Harris-
burg on Tuesday, May 2, 1837. Committees were appointed to study the
proposed amendments. Perhaps the most important and profound debate took
place on the question of the courts and the judiciary. The majority report of
the Judiciary Committee recommended "that it is inexpedient to make any
40There was no direct provision for amendments in the constitution of 1790, and the com-
mittee stated that "this circumstance has given rise to" difficulties.
SOP& Bar Assn. Reports, 1915, pp. 263-4.
5'Hazard. op. cit., XIII, p. 56. A term of five or seven years was proposed.
Z;-See Report of Legislative Committee on Finances of Pennsylvania, 1838-1843 (Harris-
burg, 1878). Printed in Pa. Bar Assn. 2nd Annual Report, 1896.
53Pa. Bar Assn. Reports. 1896, pp. 16-18.
54Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1837 (13 volumes, Harrisburg, 1838-9),
vol. i, p. iv. The vote was 86,570 to 73.166. The legislature had decided on April 14, 1835,
that "the sense of the people of Pennsylvania should be taken on the subject of holding a Con-
vention."
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amendment in" the section dealing with the judiciary. In other words, it ad-
vocated tenure during good behavior. 55
The minority report advocated the substitution of a term of years. This
was the signal for a bitter and protracted debate. Involved i, ' . question
of tenure, unfortunately, was also the matter of justices of the peace. The
latter had been appointed by the governor and it was admitted that much
abuse had occurred. Hundreds of commissions had been issued in a few
weeks by governors just going out of office-"midnight justices.""'5  Under
such circumstances, compromise was possible. It was understood that the
election of the justices was most especially the wish of the people, so the ad-
vocates of life tenure hoped that by yielding on that point no change would
be made in the term of judges.
But the Democrats regarded tenure during good behavior as an aristo-
cratic institution. They maintained it was tenure for "life" and were de-
termined that it should be abolished. Particular attention was centered upon
the apparent impossibility of removing judges. Mr. Sturdevant remarked:
"To attempt to impeach a judge in Pennsylvania was a folly. It could not
be done. The people were in consequence, compelled to submit to injustice,
to have their rights trodden under foot, and the only hope which they had of
obtaining redress was the death of the judge. .,..
Mr. Woodward continued the argument by stating that tenure during
good behavior was "life tenure." "As to the power of removal," he said, "it
is seldom successful when resorted to. If the attempt be made to remove a
judge, all the means which he can employ, himself a powerful man perhaps,
and all that his powerful friends can bring to his aid, are put in requisition to
avert the shaft of justice." It has "settled into an axiom that you can not
remove a judge for matter which is cause for impeachment," and this "is even
more difficult.' '5s
Mr. Brown said that if "you want to make a judge industrious, honest
and faithful, and to keep him within the line of his duty, never let the public
gaze be withdrawn from him. Let him know that the public are scrutinizing
his acts, and will visit them with their condemnation, if they be arbitrary or
corrupt. This responsibility had a salutary effect on all your other depart-
ments, and so it will have with the judiciary."' g
Mr. Ingersoll viewed with alarm the party results of the present judiciary
system, stating that the "judges are not to be called to account, at any time
for any misdeeds. They were secure under the protection of their commis-
55With the exception of one member the committee was composed entirely of members of
the legal profession. ibid, IV, p. 279.
58ibid, p. 281.
57ibid. p. 534. "'Once a judge, always a judge!" was a common slogan in Pennsylvania
at this time.
58ibid, p. 319.
59ibid, p. 410.
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sions, which, however, cannot change the nature of the men, but leaves them
just where they find them, subject to the inseparable infirmities of their kind-
ambition, avarice, love of ease ...... .. 0 It was also stated that if the
"tenure were limited, a judge would not drink to excess; but that, when the
tenure is good behavior, the judges have been often intoxicated with the
flowing bowl.Gt
Tenure during good behavior had many able advocates. Mr. Hopkin-
son, of Philadelphia, declared that these so-called "life offices" had originated
in England with the people, and were not "an aristocratical invention as has
been asserted." - He stated that "not a petition has been laid on our table;
in no audible, distinct manner have the people spoken to us about it; but we
are left to the vague conjectures . . . of gentlemen, drawn from sources
and founded on evidence they can neither produce nor explain." 3 Hopkin-
son said that the "objections we have heard on this floor against the tenure
of good behavior, have generally been found to consist of some local or
temporary evil, of personal defects in some existing judge," but that no argu-
ment or evidence against the principle had been heard."
Mr. Porter, a lawyer from Northampton, said: " . . . one of the
greatest evils I have had to encounter is the changes of judges. It is far bet-
ter that the judicial decisions should be uniform, and in accordance with each
other, than that they should be correct or incorrect." He asserted that he had
"seen every new judge desirous to establish some new and favorable opinion,
instead of affirming and continuing those which have been declared by his
predecessors. "05
This argument was continued by Mr. Merrill. of Union, who stated that
new judges give undue weight to different maxims, and also declared that
when a judge is nearing the end of his term people may become suspicious of
some of his decisions and would impute to him sinister motives, which other-
wise would not be thought of. "Time and experience." he said, "are neces-
sary to develop an able judge. Lawyers may take either side, while the
judge must come to a fair decision on the whole." The course of practice of
lawyers "has warped their judgment," and almost every man, when he comes
to take his seat on the bench for the first time, thinks that some things either
are, or ought to be law, which have not been so decided.""
In the midst of this important debate a clever piece of strategy occurred.
The minority report recommended a ten year term for the supreme court
judges. Many. however, considered five years as the limit. Suddenly Mr.
8Oibid, p. 447.
libid, p. 511.
:2ibid, pp. 286-7.
6sibid, p. 307.
4ibid, p. 309.
65ibid, p. 347.
Isibid, p. 361.
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Dickey, of Beaver, threw consternation into both camps by moving that the
tenure of the supreme court judges should be fifteen years .7 The resultant
situation is clearly shown in the speech of one of the delegates: "The
gentleman from Beaver proposed a term of flftee. years. whil e ni7y proposi-
tion was a term of five years. But I am willing, rather than to lose all-and
rather than to forego the opportunity now afforded for the establishing of the
principle of limited tenures, to take the term of fifteen years. . . The
question presented is a plain and practical one. Shall we take this or get
nothing?""5
On the other hand, what were the advocates of tenure for good behavior
to do? The parties were closely divided; a five or ten year term was odious
to them; fifteen years, while far short of their desire, was better than the
former. They. too, had to answer the question: "Shall we take this" or get
something worse? Thus we see the anomaly of many men voting for the
motion but speaking against it. The final vote was taken on February 16,
1838, the motion being adopted by 85 to 32.60 Thus, after a valiant struggle,
tenure during good behavior was abolished.
The Constitution of 1838 was amended in 1850, 1857 and 1864. The
amendment of 1850 is the only one pertaining to the judiciary. By it the
judges of the supreme court were to be chosen by the qualified electors of the
state at large, but no change was made in the tenure of office. The import-
ance of this amendment is evident, for it was the first time in the entire history
of Pennsylvania that the highest judicial officers were chosen by the electors.
It was undoubtedly the result of the "Democratic Era" inaugurated by the
election of Andrew Jackson. A fundamental tenet of his followers was that
all officers be elected by the people. Apparently there was much demagogy
connected with the movement, for one well-known lawyer asserted that this
amendment "was never called for by the people, was not debated or con-
sidered as so grave a matter should have been; . . . .."7 One supporter
of an elected judiciary in 1850 said he "would rather have demagogues than
demijohns" as judges.
7
1
Another important change made by the above amendment pertained to
67ibid, p. 383.
6 ibid, p. 392.
60ibid, XIII, p. 49. The constitution as amended was submitted to the people, and was
adopted by the small majority of 1,212. The vote was 113,971 to 112,759. Constitutions of
Pennsylvania (Legislative Reference Bureau, prepared by Fertig and Hunter), p. 3.
70Mr. Woodward, who served in both the conventions of 1837-8 and 1872-3. Debates of
the Constitutional Convention of 1872-3, III, p. 744. The amendment passed both Houses in
one year, again passed the next year, and was then submitted to the people and adopted. ibid.
p. 751.
'ibid, p. 777.
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the question of removal. For any reasonable cause which should not be suffi-
cient ground for impeachment, the governor had the power to remove the
judges upon the address of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature. This
provision was also found in the Constitutions of 1790 and 1838, but was not
imperative. It authorized the removal upon address, but was not categoric,
simply stating that the governor may do so. By the amendment of 1850 re-
moval was made obligatory by substituting the word shall for may.7
2
One more change in the history of judicial tenure should be noted. Dur-
ing the years immediately following the Civil War until about 1875 Pennsyl-
vania was governed worse than at any other time. A political ring was in
almost complete control and special and local legislation was passed in their
interests. In 1872, for example, the legislature passed 1113 bills, of which it
is estimated that only 43 were general laws.-7 One contemporary asserted
that it "had come to be generally believed that the lobby had as much to do
with legislation as the members of the Senate and House, and charges of
fraud were frequently circulated." 4 So widespread was the dissatisfaction
that the legislature decided on April 11, 1872, to call a convention to amend
the constitution.7 ' The Convention met on November 12, 1872, at Harris-
burg, but adjourned on the 27th to meet in Philadelphia on January 7, 1873. 76
Judicial tenure became one of the subjects for discussion, giving rise to a
long debate. On November 21, 1872, a resolution was introduced stating:
"That the Committee on Judiciary be instructed to inquire into the expediency
of providing that all judges who are required to be learned in the law shall
be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and that they shall hold their offices during good behavior .. .. ,,7
Immediately other resolutions were presented advocating election by the
people and a limited term, varying from fifteen to twenty years.
It is evident that many divergent views regarding judicial tenure existed.
On March 26 it was stated in the convention that the report of the judiciary
committee would not be unanimous, and it was predicted that there would be
72In a legislative address Governor McKean frankly declared: "I will let the Legislature
know, that may means I won't." C. R. Buckalew, Examination of the Constitution exhibiting
the derivation and history of its provisions (Philadelphia, 1883), p. 126. See the attempt
made in 1789 to do the same thing. supra, p. 14, note 39.
7"Franklin S. Edmonds, "Development of Constitutional Limitations in Pennsylvania," Pa.
Bar Assn. Reports, 1915, pp. 266-7. See also statement of Mr. Justice Mitchell in Common-
wealth v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504 (1900).
7'Samuel Dickson, "The Development in Pennsylvania of Constitutional Restraints upon
the Power and Procedure of the Legislature." Pa. Bar Assn. Reports, 1896, p. 28.
7aP. L., pp. 53-7.
7'Debates, 1872-3, op. cit., vol. I.
77ibid. p. 89.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
several minority reports.7 One member said he understood that the report
was "very revolutionary in character, and, in fact, changes the entire system
of our judiciary.
' '
79
The next day the committee reported. Section two of the report stated
that the supreme court was to consist of seven judges, nominated by the Gov-
ernor, and by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
appointed and commissioned by him. They were to hold office for twenty-
one years, but were not eligible for re-appointment. The judges were to re-
ceive "an adequdte compensation, to be fixed by law, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their continuance in office."80
The reports of the dissenting members differed widely. In general they
favored an elective judiciary and opposed the attempt to restore the old
system."' Mr. Bromall. in a dissenting report, said he seemed to stand "alone
in his desire to leave the judiciary system substantially as it is."8' 2 Tenure
during good behavior was linked with the appointment of the judges by the
governor and senate. If that could not be obtained, then, as one member
said, "it is quite as well that they would feel dependent upon the good opin-
ion of the people of the district, as upon that of a political Governor and
Senate."83
Aside from a long debate on the question whether the judges would be
elected by districts or by the electors of the state at large,ssa the discussion
centered on an elective or appointive judiciary. The strongest supporter of
the latter was Mr. Woodward. He stated that practically everyone with
whom he talked was in favor of abolishing the elective judiciary, and asserted
that when the convention was in Harrisburg the sentiment was "as nearly
unanimous on this point as it was possible for public sentiment to be on any
subject." He got the impression that "this great reform" was going to be
"accomplished in the easiest possible manner," but soon found how "young
and green" he was, for in the judiciary committee "nobody, or scarcely any-
body, was in favor of appointing the judges."
Mr. Woodward's main contention was that "the mass of voters are in-
competent to judge of judges; they cannot select intelligently. It is an utter
absurdity," he said, "to submit a comparison of judicial attainments and quali-
78ibid. 11, p. 154. The chairman asked leave to have 1500 copies of the report printed.
Objection was raised to the large number, but the chairman said he desired to have it "circu-
lated freely among the lawyers and judges."
70ibid, p. 155.
Soibid, p. 182.
81ibid, pp. 188, 191, 200. The following dissented from the report of the committee:
Kaine, Purviance, Dallas, Bromall, Reynolds and Woodward.
8Zibid, p. 201.
siibid, p. 201.
s8aThe debate dragged on so long that one member said that limitations must be made "if
we intend to get away from here at any time before 1876, unless we intend to sit here as a
monument to he looked at by the people coming to the centenial exhibition." ibid, p. 741.
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fications to masses of men who know not the candidates, who know not the
duties to be performed, nor the training and education essential to a right dis-
charge of those duties.""I
Mr. Temple, Philadelphia. declared that "the judges of the city and
county of Philadelphia are primarily elected by about a score of politicians in
this county."' s  In fact, it was asserted that candidates for judgeships were
"found around the town trading and bartering with other persons who are
candidates for other positions in the campaign."' On the other hand, it was
contended that judges would be appointed for partisan reasons, and corrup-
tion could also creep in.7
The first vote on any judicial question was taken on the motion that the
judges of the supreme court be elected by the legal voters of the state at large.
It was carried by 67 to 23.18 It was now evident that tenure for good be-
havior was doomed, and, as Mr, Curtin said, "in the presence of so large a
vote . . . we must abandon all hope of reaching an independent tenure
to the judiciary by appointment." and get as long a term as possible. 9 On
May 1 an entirely new section was proposed, with a term of fifteen years.00
The next day a motion was carried by a vote of 57 to 25 to extend this to
twenty-one years. 91 The final decision was: "The Supreme Court shall con-
sist of seven judges, who shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State
at large. They shall hold their offices for the term of -twenty-one years, if
they so long behave themselves well, but shall not be again eligible. The
judge whose commission shall first expire shall be chief justice, and thereafter
each judge whose commission shall first expire shall in turn be chief justice."'
The constitution was ratified by the qualified electors on December 16, 1873,
and went into effect on January 1, 1874.'
The constitution of 1873 is very vague concerning the question of re-
moval. The clarity of the earlier constitutions and amendments in this re-
spect is replaced by a clause which is extremely ambiguous. Instead of the
shall in the amendment of 1850 we again have may. But whether this applies
to the justices of the Supreme Court is uncertain. Article 5, section 15. states
that "All judges required to be learned in the law, except the judges of the
Supreme Court, shall be elected by the qualified electors of the respective dis-
tricts over which-they are to preside,- and shall hold their offices for the period
84ibid, pp. 734-7; 741-3.
85ibid, p. 757.
S6ibid, p. 757.
8ribid, pp. 747-9.
88ibid, IV, p. 41.
89ibid, pp. 58-9.
90ibid, p. 47.
91ibid, p. 69. There was little debate on the tenure. Most of the discussion centered on
the question of dividing the state into districts and having the judges elected therein.
92Article V. section 2.
OsConstitutions of Pennsylvania, Fertig and Moore, p. 9.
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of ten years, if they shall so long behave themselves well; but for any reason-
able cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the Gov-
ernor may remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each House of
the General Assembly.1"
94
Does "any of them" refer to both Supreme Court and Common Pleas
judges? If the above clause does not apply to Supreme Court justices, which
appears to be a reasonable interpretation, " , then they can be removed only
by impeachment, '6 for Article VI, section 4, distinctly exempts "judges of the
courts of record learned in the law" from removal by the Governor on ad-
dress of two-thirds of the Senate.9T The removal of Supreme Court justices
upon address, therefore, depends entirely upon the interpretation given to
Article V. section 15. Under this article a judge could be removed for
physical disability, but only on the address of two-thirds of each House?8
The whole matter, however, has never been judicially determined.
The history of judicial tenure in Pennsylvania shows very clearly that
every phase of the subject was debated at some time or other, and that every
type of tenure, from one year in the early period to good behavior from 1790
to 1838, was tried. The appointive method was in operation from the very
foundation of the colony in 1682 until 1850, when it was superseded by pop-
ular election. Each change was the result of some broad movement in Amer-
ican life and politics which swept Pennsylvania along with it.
941talics my own.
95One authority says, however, that the clause "any of them" may refer to both Supreme
Court and Common Pleas judges. Thomas R. White, Commentaries on the Constitution of
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1907), p. 325.
9GSee C. R. Buckalew, Examination of the Constitution exhibiting the derivation and his-
tory of its provisions (Philadelphia, 1883), p. 126.
97A judge could be removed upon a conviction, in due course of law, of misbehavior in
office or of the commission of an infamous crime, under the first sentence of Article VI, section
4, which states: "All officers shall hold their offices on condition that they behave themselves
well while in office, anil shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any in-
famous crime." But who shall remove a judge so convicted? See Buckalew, op. cit., p. 186.
ORemoval of judge of Common Pleas {opinion of Attorney-General), 5 Dist. Rep., 158
(1896).
